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MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN U.S. FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRIES

~

~::

I. Introduction·
.

~

The relationship between market structure and profitability has been one
of the most thoroughly tested hypotheses i~ industrial economics. 1 Nonetheless,
a number of authors have recently reexamined the specification of these studies
and cautioned on a number of conceptual difficulties implicit in this type of
research.

It has been argued, for example, that the influence of the price elas-

ticity of demand and the role of international factors-such as multinational
activity and foreign trade, should be explicitly incorporated into the model
[7, 8, 15, 1~].

In addition, closer attention should be paid to the interpre-

tation of empirical results in light of the paucity of theoretical evidence linking the seller concentration ratio to allocative performance [ 17 ].
I

-

This paper examines these basic questions regarding the nature and empirical
specification of the structure-performance model~ and incorporates the modifications suggested by this analysis into an empirical test of the relationship between price-cost margins and market structure in U.S. food-processing industdes.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II discusses the conceptual
issues raised in the literature in more detail.

Section III describes the data

and variables used in the empirical analysis. The statistical results are presented in Section IV, and the conclusions and implications of the study are
summarized in Section V.
I-·
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II.

Some Conceptual Problems.

.{

Price El ast.i city of D_emand
· A common element among empirical studies of the structure-profits relationship has been a neglect of variables which account for inter-industry differentials
in market price elasticities of demand. This ommission, however, does not appear
justified by the underlying theoretical models. 2 For ·example, it is well known
that in the short run monopoly case, profit maximizing behavior results in a
systematic inverse relationship between price-cost margins and market price
elasticity of demando
(P-MC)/P

=

More specifically this relationship is expressed as

1/e~ where P,MC, and e represent price, marginal cost, and price

. ela.sticity of demand, respectively.

This result implies that given two monopo-

lists with identical cost conditions their profit margins will differ depending
upon differences in market price elasticities of demand at the profit maximizing
level of output.

The importance of demand elasticity in affecting profit margins

has been demonstrated by Cowling [ 7] and Hause [ 10] also to apply to the case
of oligopoly. 3
In long run equilibrium, price elasticity of demand-will influence profit
margins only if some barriers to entry exist.

In the absence of entry barriers

the long run competitive result will obtain so that each firrn 1 s price-cost
margin will approach zero, and market demand elasticity becomes irrelevant.
Indeed, it is this type of thinking which has led some economists [26, 27] to
suggest that it is the supply function of potential entrants and the heights
of barriers bo entry which determine the long run profit maximizing margin, to
the exclusion of demand elasticity consi~erations.

However~ given varying

degrees of barriers to entry, the theories of limit pricing [14] suggest that
_demand elasticity should still be inversely related to margins, since i t
represents one of the determinants of the height to which the limit price can
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be raised above competitive levels.
-

All of the above arguments thus suggest that a proper empirical sp_~cj_fica-.
,.

tion of the structure -pr.ofits relationship should account for inter-industry
differentials in price elasticities of demand.
Concentration and Oligopoly Theory:
One of the continuing criticisms of structure-profits studies concerns the
use of the concentration ratio to describe the degree of oligopoly or monopoly
power within an industry.

Hhile a rather large number of existing oligopoly

theories suggest relationships between profits and the number offirms in the
market or a Herfindahl index of the size distribution of firms [7, 17, 22],
virtually no theoretical justification exists for predicting a direct relationship between concentration ratios and industry profitability. The only model
that indicates a precise theoretical relationship between concentration and profits, as demonstrated by Saving [18], is the collusive dominant firm oligopoly
model. 4 Thus, empirical findings of higher profits in concentrated industries
could be attributable, as Demsetz [9] has pointed but, to any number of factors
(such as greater efficiency) and not exclusively to monopoly restrictions.
The above arguments notwithstanding, the concentration ratio continues to
be the measure of choice in empirical analyses of the structure-profits relationship.
The simple explanation for this appears to be the unavailability of data for
other indicies of monoply power which cover so broad a spectrum of industries
and time periods as the available concentration data.

Since data limitations

require the continued use of concentration ratios, it would be helpful to have
a better idea of the appropriate specification of the concentration-profits
linkages.

One way to approach this problem is to more carefully analyze the

importance of firm interdependence in oligopoly situations.
it

For.example, if

is .assumed that firms are profit maximizers, one would expect that they will

evaluate the potential costs and benefits of collusive action.

The greater the
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extent to which firms recognize their mutual interdependence, the greater Js
~

the liklihood of the·ir recognition of the benefits attributable to some form of.
~

,

col]usive behavior.

If (allusion is successful, the monopoly result provides an

upper bound on the spread between pr-ice and marginal (average) cost.

.

To the ex···

tent that collusion is ineffective or impo~sible, results closer to the competitive
case should prevail.
While concentration is not synonymous with a firm's perception of interdependence, it is not unreasonable to expect that as markets become more concentrated, firms may become increasingly aware of their mutual interdependence.
This suggests that a more appropriate specification of the concentration - profits
relationship should focus on changes in the variables rather than levels.

More-

over, since it has been pointed out [7, 19] that collusion is likely to be
facilitated when fi rrns have a hi story of experience with one another, 1ags may
be involved in the relationship, which further supports a specification based
upon changes rather than levels.
t

Import Competition, Exporting and Multinational Activity
Another common element of most structure-profit studies has been the exclusion of variables to account for inter-industry differences in foreign trade
and investment.

Recent theoretical and empirical evidence, however, suggests

that these foreign factors are important determinats of industry performance. 5
For example, the market power usually associated with highly concentrated degrees
of actual or potential import competition. · In effect, import competition increases the n'umber of firms within an industry and dilutes the degree of domestic
seller concentration and theoretically should result in prices and profits being
closer to competitive levels.
Exporting opportunities may also effect performance in the ~omestic market,
but n6 unambigious relationship can be theoretically derived.

Caves [5] for ex-

ample has shown that in the case of monopoly, the existence of export markets
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can constrain the departure from a competitive pricing outcome in the dom~stic
market if the firm is unable to price discriminate internationally.

He has fur-

ther argued that this result is equally plausible in the context of oligopoly,
in -that, expansion into foreign markets may render sellers less conscious of
their mutual interdependence in the domestic market.

Nonetheless, to the extent

that domestic firms are able to engage in internation~l price discri~ination,
then expansion into foreign expbrt markets (assuming a more elastic demand in
'-

foreign markets) will result in increases rather than decreases in domestic
prices and profits.
Finally, it has been argued [5, 11 J that the performance of firms in the
.domestic market may be significantly influenced by the degree to which foreign
direct investment in markets abroad has taken place. Although there exist many
channels and theories concerning the possible feedback ~ffects from foreign
investment operations on domestic activities, perhaps the most important effect,
from a market structure point of view, is that the existence of multi-national
activity may act to discourage entry in the domest,c market.

For example,

foreign ·investment may open up new opportunities for firms to engage fo price
discrimination and predatory pricing, or provide them funds that otherwise
might not be available to maintain expensive advertising programs or new product
development in the domestic market.

If foreign investment does indeed act to

discourage entry or confer economies of size, this should be reflected in
higher profits being earned in the domestic market in industries with foreign
investments than in those without.
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III. Sample and Variables
The empirical investigation of the structure-profitability relationship
•
,;

in the U.S. food-processing sector utilizes multiple regression analysis.

The

basic tests of this study are applied to 52 Census four- and five-.digit food
manufacturing industries for the years 1967 and 1972. 6
The dependent variable used to measure industry profitability is the pricecost margin constructed from Census date [24]. ·The price-cost margin PCM is
defined as the percentage gross return before taxes on industry sales:
PCM=

Value added - Payroll - Rentals

,

x l 00

Value of shipments
Value added was derived by the Census by subtracting from value of shipments the costs of materials, supplies, fuel, electric energy, cost of resales
and contract costs. · The choice of the price-cost margin as the measure of
profitability was predicated upon a number of factors.

First, it is the only

measure of profitability available at a level of a9gregration consistant with
Thus, the calculation and interpretation of weighted
concentration ratios is avoided. 7 Second, it allows the use of industry as

the concentration data.

opposed to firm data, which should minimize the problems encountered due to
diversification that have been shown [12, 13] to present severe estimation
problems.

Finally, the price-cost margin, which approximates a rate of return

on sales may indeed by conceptually superior, as Weiss [25] has recently argued,
·to rates of return on equity or assets. 8
The estimated regression equations include nine independent variables.
Along with the more traditional structural variables-such as seller concentration, scale economies, the capital-output ratio, the rate of grovJth in industry
demand, and the extent to which markets are national or localized - the model

8
'•
incorporates the impact of demand e1asticity and international factors onL,n-

dustry price-cost margins.
'The measure of seller concentration CR utilized in the analysis is the four-_
firm concentration ratio obtained from Census date [24].

The implicit assump-

tion regarding the published concentration ratios is that of a national market
which tends to understate the extent of concentration in industries such as
bread and milk which have local or regional markets.

In order to account for

the regional or local content of some industries in the samp1e, a dummy var-iable
RD was constructed on the basis of information presented by Schwartzman and
Bodoff [20] and Siegfried and Grawe [21].

This regional dummy is defined so

that its expected sign is positive:
RD

=

l, if regional or local industry,

=

0, ·otherwise.

In addition to seller concentration, the barriers to entry from economies
of scale in production have been included as a determinant
of profit margins.
t
In the absence of direct scale economy measures - such as those based on survey
and engineering methods - a statistical proxy was constructed, based upon work
by Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, and Porter [6].

The economies of scale ES

barrier utilized in this study was expressed as the following interaction
variable:
ES = ( MES / CDR ) * _l 00
where MES is the conventional minimum efficient plant scale, calculated as the
average plant size among the largest plants accounting for 50 per cent of
G

industry value added and expressed as a percentage of industry value added.
CDR is the cost disadvantage ratio, computed as the average value added per
employee in plants producing the lower 50 per cent of industry value added
divided by average value added per employee in plants producing the top

9

50 per cent.

Under a number of assumptions [6, pp. 133-34], CDR can be

viewed as measuring the diseconomies of small scale.

~

Thus, the use of the

ratio'MES/COR as a proxy for scale economies implies that the barriers to the
potential entrant are higher, the larger is minimum optimal plant size relative
to the size of the market, and the greater is the extent of productivity disadvantage suffered by smaller plants.

Given the construction of our variable,

profit margins should be positively related to the height of scale barriers to
entry.

(ES).

Since gross capital costs are included i~ our definition of the pricecost margin, the capital-output ratio was utilized as an explanatory var.iable
in order to account for the possibl~ bias arising from the fact that our computed margins would be higher in capital-intensive industries.

The capital-

output ratio K/0 mea.sure is defined as the ratio of net book value of depreciable
assets to value of shipments.
In addition~ two market characteristics - market growth and elasticity of
demand- were included in the model.

l

The expectation is that the growth in out-

put is positively related to industry profit margins.

Growth in output may be

attributable to increases in product demand, decreases in industry costs, or
both.

Reductions in costs 1ead directly to greater profitability, while in-

creased prices and/or reductions in unit cost due to greater capacity utilization.

The growth in demand variable (GR) was defined as the percentage change

in nominal value added over the last six years.

As suggested in an earlier

section, the theoretical expectation is that a lower elasticity of demand will
~

be associated with higher profit margins. While it would have been interesting
to attempt our own estimates of demand elasticity, this task was beyond the
scope of this paper.

As an alternative, estimates of price elasticity of

demand (PED) for food products calculated by Brandow [2] and Imel [12] were
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utilized.

Since their estimates for a number of cases did not conform to.,_:our

.

.

.

industry classification, some averaging was necessary.

These demand elasticity

estimates should be interpreted to reflect relative elasticity differences across
industries; rather than an exact level figure.
Finally, three explanatory variables that capture the international dimensions of our industry sample were incorporated in the·model.

First, to measure

the extent of direct foreign investment activity (MN) undertaken by U.S. foodprocessing industries, estimates were obtained for 1965 from Bruck and Lees [3Ji
and for 1971 from Horst [11].

This measure, based on data for Fortune's 500

largest corporations, consists of the percentage foreign content of totpl economic
activity for the largest firms within each industry.
by

Foreign content was measured

either one or a combinati.on of the following factors; sales9 earnings9 employ-

ment, or production abroad.

The expectation is that direct foreign investment

will exert a positive influence upon industry profitability.

To complete the

model, the ratio of exports to value of shipments (XVS) that represents the
industry's reliance on export sales, and the ratio' of current imports to value
of shipments (MVS) as a proxy for foreign competition were included. 9

•
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IV. Statistical Results
Table l shows the estimated regressions foi our sample of ·52 U.S. foodprocessing industries for the years 1967 and 1972.

Two specifications of the

model - with and without the price elasticity of demand variable - are presented.

Due to the interactive nature of thi explanatory variables, a multi-

plicative form of the relationship between price-cost·margins and market structure seems appropriate.

For example, the influence -of concentration is not

likely to be independent of the effect of price elasticity of demand and the
degree of import competition.

For this reason a double-logarithmic equation

form was utilized.
A comparison of the statistical results for 1967 and 1972, both in terms
of the significance of the individual coefficients and the coefficient of
determination, indicates that they are stronger for the later period.

Further-

more, the coefficients for the traditional market structure variables possess
the hypothesized sign.

In particular, the concentration ratio (CR) and the

capital-output ratio (K/0) are directly associatedt with industry margins and
are statistically significant at the one percent level.

The economies of

scale variable (ES) has the expected positive sign but is significant at the
one percent level only in 1972.

The coefficients for the growth in demand

variable (GR) and the regional dummy (RD) also display the hypothesized
positive sign and both are significant in all cases at the 10% level or better.
While these results confirm the importance of traditional domestic structural
variables, some ihteresting results ate obtained from the introduction of the
price elasticity of demand variable and the foreign factors.

The regression

coeff"icients for the demand elasticity variable (PED) display the expected
negative sign and are significant at the 5% level.

In order to evaluate the

contribution of the price elasticity of demand to the structure-profit relation-

TABLE 1
Regression Equations Relating Price-Cost Margins to Structural Variables
in U.S. Food-Processing Industries~ 1967 ·and 1972

Year

Intercept

1967

-2.72c

.546a

(l. 49)

(3.47)

(1.00)

(4.61)

-2.40c
(1. 38)

.578a
(3.84)

.178
( 1.28)

-3.29b
(l. 92)

.498a
(3.25)

-3.30 b

.499a
(3.38)

1967

1972

1972

( l. 99}

Log(CR)

Log(K/0)

Log(GR)

PD

.628a

•775b
(2.11)

( l. 55)

(4.97)

.600b
(1 . 68)

( l.68)

.325a
(3.11)

.522a
(4.14)

. 778a
(2 .67)

.256c

• 137b

( l. 38)

(l.77)

.335 a
(3.32)

.558a

~738a
( 2. 61 j

.232c
( 1. 30)

Log{ES)

• 145

t-values in. parenthesei
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.

.646a

(4.53)

PED

.29lc

.294b

-.42lb
(2.32)

-.33lb
(2.01)

Log(MN)

Log(XVS)

Log(MVS)

. l 83b
(2 .Ol)

-.079
( l . 20)

-.007

-.060

-.012

• l 92b

( 2. 21 )

(. 95)
-. 112b
(1.87)

.139b

- • 101 b

( 1. 85)

(l.73)

F

7.32

.576

7.77

.625

-.002

8.73

.619

-.006

8.76

.652

(. 12)

(.22)

(.05)

(. 12)
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ship, a statistical test wa~ undertaken.

The error sum of squares was

ef

computed for an unrestricted form of the model \~h"ich included the demand
elasticity, and a restricted form of the model which excluded this variable.
The significance of including the demand elasticity was then determined by
an F test for the reduction in error sum of ~quares between the restricted
and unrestricted regression models.

The F statistics:obtained are 5.66 for

1967 and 4.24 for 1972, and both are significant at the 5% level.

This result

further reinforces the conclusion that the demand elasticity is an important
determinant of profit margins in U.S. food-processing industries.
With regard to the international factors, the most striking result.s were
obtained for the direct foreign investment variable (MN).

The coefficients

for this variable are positive as expected, and are significant in all cases
at the 5% level.

The results obtained for the export share variable (XVS)

indicate that the coeffieient has the hypothesized negative sign, but is
significant at the 5% level only in the equations for 1972.

Finally, the.

evidence regarding the import share variable (MVSY was less conclusive.

While

the coefficient for this variable displays the expected negative sign, it was
never statistically significant.

This may be attributed in large part to the

small position import competition occupied in food processing during our sample
period.

In only 7 out of 52 industries was the import share greater than 10%,

while in the majority of cases virtually no imports entered the domestic
market.
Thus far the· empirical analysis has focused upon the relationship between
levels of variables in two distinct time periods.

It was indicated earlier,

however, that a potentially more meaningful approach is to analyze the relationship between changes in profitability and changes in structure over time.

A

specification which utilized as a dependent variable changes in profit margins

14
V. Conclusions

ef

This paper has reviewed some conceptual problems inherent in studies of
the market structure-profitability relationship and provided an empirical test
of the hypotheses advanced based on U.S. Food-processing industries.

The major

issues discussed included the role of price ilasticity of demand, the influence
of foreign factors and the use of concentration ratios in the specification of
structure-performance studies.

The statistical results obtained suggest that

international factors, and in particular the extent of multi-national activity,
constitute an important influence upon the performance in the domestic market
of the U.S. food-processing sector.

Moreover9 domestic structural factors,

such as the degree and changes in seller concentration, have a statistically
significant impact on industry price-cost margins even when account is made
for inter-industry variations in price elasticity of demand.

15

over the 1967-72 time period was also estimated.lo The results are as fo1~ows:

.002 + .172 ln(CR ;cR ) + .041 ln(Es ;Es ) + .329 ln(K/0 /K/0 ) +
72 67
72 67
71
67

(.10)

(1.52)

(1.18)

· (2.16)

.

V

+ .336 ln(GR

(3.75)

72-67

/GR

67-63

)-- .028 ln(MN /MN ) - .065 ln(XVS /SVS )(.41)
71
65
(1.14)
71
67

F := 3.92

2
R = .384

The results for the equation utilizing r~tes of change are similar to those
provided in Table 1.

Of particular note, the coefficient for changes in the con-

centration ratio remains positive and is significant at the 10% level;

Other

domestic variables such as changes in the capital output ratio and changes in
growth rates of dem 9nd display the expected positive signs and are significant
at the 5% level or better.

While the coefficient for changes in economics of

scale is positive, as expected, it was not stastically significant.

With re-

t

gard to the foreign variables some differences arise.

First, the coefficient

for changes in import share now becomes significant and has the expected negative
sign.

Secondj the coefficients for changes in multinational activity and export

share are not significant.

Overall, however, the results obtained from the rate

of change variables conform well to those obtained utilizing levels.

;
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Footnotes

* We gratefully acknowledge the financial support given by the Center for,
~

International Studies at the University of Mis~ouri-St. Louis.
1. For a recent survey of these studies see Weiss [25].
2. This argument has been presented most forcefully by Cowling and .Waterson [8].
While this argument loses its power under the assumption that demand
elasticity is the same across industries, this assumption does not conform to
the available evidence [2,12].
3. Caves [4] has further suggested that demand elasticity should be considered
an element of market structure.

His argument is that the penalties associated

with price cutting are less severe in industries with more elastic derand, since

a price

cut by a rival will result not only in a potential increase _in market

share, but also an overall expansion in industry sales.

Thus, if demand is

more elastic, rivals are likely to find it more difficult to maintain overt
or tacit agreements on price.
4. There is of course some correlation between the degree of concentration, the
number of firms within an industry, and the Herfindahl index.

But while ex-

tremely high or low values of concentration are likely to be good proxies for
the number of firms, the association is less direct for intermediate ranges
of concentration.

For some recent results concerning the association of con-

centration ratios to other measures of monopoly power see Hause [10].
5. For a more complete analysis of the role of imports, exports, and multinational activity on domestic industry pricing and profits see Pagoulatos
and Sorensen [15, 16].

;
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6. The industries included in this study (with the 1972 S.I.C. number in p~renthesis) are: 1) Meatpacking (2011); 2) Sausages and other prepared meats (2013);
3).Poultry dressing (2016, 2017); 4) Creamery Butter (2021); 5) Cheese (2022);
6) Condertsed and evaporated milk (2023); 7) Ice cream and ices (2024);
8) Fluid milk (2026); 9) Canned specialiti~s (2032); 10) Canned fruits and
vegetables (2033); 11) Dried and dehydrated fruits and vegetables (2034);
12) Pickles, sauces and salad dressings (2035); 13) Frozen fruits, vegetables
and juices (2037, 2038); 14) Flour and other grain mill products (2041);
15) Cereal breakfast foods (2043); 16) Milled rice and byproducts (2044);
17) Blended and prepared flour (2045); 18) Wet corn milling (2046); 19) Pet
food (2047); 20) Prepared feeds (2048); · 21) Bread and bakery products (2051);
22) Cookies and crackers (2052); 23) Raw cane sugar (2061); 24) Sugar refining
(2062) 2063); 25) Confectionery products (2065); 26) Chocolate and cocoa products (2066); 27) Chewing gum (2067); 28) Cottonseed oil mills (2074); 29) soybean oil mills

(2075); 30) vegetable oil mills (2076); 31) Animal and marine

fats and oils (2077); 32) Shortening, table oilst and margarine (2079); 33) Malt
beverages (2082); 34) Malt (2083); 35) Wines, brandy and brandy spirits (2084);
36) Distilled liquor (2085); 37) Soft drinks (2086); 38) Flavoring extracts and
syrups (2087); 39) Canned and cured seafood (2091); 40) Fresh or frozen packaged
fish (2092); 41) Roasted coffee (2095); 42) Manufactured ice (2097); 43) Macaroni
products (2098); 44) Dessert mixes (20991); 45) Chips (20992); 46) Sweetening
syrups and molasses (20993); 47) Baking powder and yeast (20994); 48) Vinegar
and cider (20996); 49) Cigarettes (2111); 50) Cigars (2121); 51) Chewing and
smoking tobacco and snuff (2131); 52) Tobacco stemming and redrying (2141).
7. For an opinion on the appropriatness of weighted concentration ratios see
Boyle [l].
-;

8. One potentially serious problem with the price-cost margin is that advertising

18

expenditures are not netted out in arriving at margin figures.

Given that

the industries studied are all consumer goods within a specifiG sector this
problem is probably minimized, but without detailed data on adv~rtising it
is difficult to determine the possible bias.
9. Values of exports and imports were obtained from [23].
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